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ABSTRACT 
The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanisms whose 
equilibrium outcomes are optimal according to some social choice rule. However, the cleverness of 
these mechanisms relies on intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. 
Generally, it is not in the designer's best interest to go through with the reward/punishment in the 
"subgame" arising from some  disequilibrium play.  This would make  the mechanism's  outcome 
function non-credible.  In the context  of  exchange economies, we  define an appropiate notion of 
"credible" implementation and show that (a) the non-dictatorial Pareto correspondence can be credibly 
implemented (b) there exists no credibly implementable Pareto-efficient and individually rational social 
choice  rule  and  (c)  there  exists no  credibly  implementable  fair  social choice rules.  We  derive 
necessary and sufficient conditions for credible implementability of choice rules. The main implication 
is paradoxical: it is suboptimal for the designer to be endowed with "too much" information about 
the  economy.  Finally,  we  show that  the  negative  results  persist  even under  weaker  credibility 
requirements . 